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Location, Governance/ and Strategic Determinants
of Japanese Manufacturing Investment in the United States
Abstract
A firm's decision to manufacture abroad depends on location, governance, and
strategic factors. Although it is obvious that firm-specific (as well as
industry) characteristics lead to foreign direct investment (FDI) and that
internalization and strategic interaction theories are complementary, only a
handful of empirical studies have considered both sets of variables
simultaneously, and have done so at the firm-level. This paper is the first
large sample study of the determinants of foreign direct investment at the
product and firm-level. It examines the impact of location and governance
factors, and of four types of strategic interactions, on a Japanese firm's
propensity to manufacture in the U.S.
The results support the predictions of the modern theory of FDI, which
combines location and governance variables, and point to the relevance of
strategic factors. Economies of scale and trade barriers encourage Japanese
FDI in the U.S. The larger a Japanese firm's R&D expenditures, the greater
the probability it will manufacture in the U.S., but this is not the case for
advertising expenditures. On the strategic front, Japanese firms with medium
domestic market shares have the highest propensity to invest in the U.S.
There is evidence of follow-the-leader behavior between firms of rival
enterprise groups, but none of "exchange-of-threat" between American and
Japanese firms. Japanese investors are also attracted by concentrated and
high-growth U.S. industries.

I . Introduction
It stands to reason that a firm's decision to integrate into foreign
manufacturing should depend both on its own capabilities and on the behavior
of its rivals. Yet empirical studies on foreign direct investment (FDI) have
concentrated exclusively on the former or on the latter, but almost never on
both. Internalization theory focuses only on firm-specific assets in ex-
plaining the decision of firms to expand abroad and ignores strategic interac-
tions between firms of the "follow-the-leader" (Knickerbocker 1973; Flowers
1976) or "exchange-of-threat" types (Graham 1974, 1978). In other words, it
assumes that firms act by themselves, and that they do not react to their
competitors. Conversely, strategic interaction theories (Knickerbocker 1973;
Graham 1974, 1978; Flowers 1976) do not take into account firm-specific
factors which may lead firms to invest abroad even in the absence of strategic
imperatives.
Although it is obvious that internalization and strategic interaction
theories are complementary, only a few empirical studies (Caves et al. 1980;
Terpstra and Yu 1988; Yu and Ito 1988) have considered both sets of variables
simultaneously. In contrast to the present work, they neither cover the full
range of manufacturing industries nor do they investigate various types of
strategic interactions simultaneously. This study is the first to explore the
impact of location and governance factors, and of four types of strategic
interactions, on a firm's propensity to invest abroad.
Ours is also the first large scale study of the determinants of FDI at
the product and firm-level . With the exception of Swedenborg (1979) and
Grubaugh (1987), previous empirical studies have been at the industry level
(Caves 1974; Pugel 1981; Kim and Lyn 1987; Kogut and Chang 1991; Drake and
Caves 1992). One strong argument for firm-level studies is that both in-
dustrial organization (Hymer 1976) and transaction cost theories of FDI (e.g.
Hennart 1982) stress that it is firm-specific characteristics that lead to
FDI. Running tests at the industry level assumes that all firms are homogeneo-
us within an industry (Porter 1981; Nelson 1991), an assumption that we now
know to be unwarranted (Rumelt 1991).
In this paper, we focus on the determinants of the decision of Japanese
firms to manufacture a given product in the United States. Japanese investment
has grown rapidly in the last decade, raising considerable interest and even
some alarm. One important element of the debate is the extent to which
Japanese FDI possesses unique characteristics that differentiate it from
European or American FDI . The results of this paper throw some additional
light on this issue.
The next section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on FDI,
and identifies the principal variables. Section 3 describes data and methodo-
logy, and elaborates on the variables. Section 4 reports the results, and the
last section presents our conclusions.
2 . The Determinants of FDI
2 . 1 Location and Governance Factors
Internalization theorists (e.g. Buckley and Casson 1976; Hennart 1982,
1991a; Dunning 1981) see FDI as the result of two sequential decisions (see
Figure 1). The first decision is whether to manufacture products at home and
export them, or whether to manufacture them abroad (the location decision).
Given a decision to manufacture abroad, the second decision is whether a firm
will rent or sell its own firm-specific advantages to local firms, or whether
it will internalize their transfer (the governance decision). 1 Hence, two
types of variables affect a firm's decision to invest abroad: (a) those that
determine the optimum location of production (location factors); (b) those
that determine the optimal governance structure to exploit advantages (gover-
nance factors).
Insert Figure 1 about here
2.1.1 Location Factors
The optimum location of production depends on plant economies of scale,
transportation costs, tariff and non-tariff barriers, relative production
costs, and on the presence of long-standing customers in the foreign market.
Scale economies: When the product produced by a firm has a relatively
large plant minimum efficient scale (MES), it makes sense to centralize
production in a few plants in order to exploit economies of scale and to serve
foreign markets from that plant. On the other hand, the cost disadvantages of
setting up foreign production facilities are lower when plant MES is small
relative to the market.
Transportation Coats: High transportation cost results in an increase in
delivered cost, and, everything else constant, encourages foreign production.
This negative relationship between transportation costs and FDI propensity
holds if the firm's production is sold to customers in the target market.
Tariff and Non-tariff Barriers: A firm can bypass tariff and non-tariff
barriers on its exports by establishing manufacturing facilities abroad.
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Hence, high tariffs and non-tariff barriers stimulate FDI.
Relative Production Coats: Everything else constant, foreign production
is also more likely when production costs are lower abroad than at home.
International differences in production costs are higher for inputs which
incur high transportation costs, for example natural resources and production
workers, than for factors which are more mobile, such as capital and manage-
ment.
Presence of Customers: Firms may find it desirable to follow their long-
standing customers into foreign markets.
2.1.2 Governance factors
The market for intangibles, such as proprietary knowledge and goodwill
(reputation), is often imperfect, and hence firms which invest in the genera-
tion of these intangibles have also a high propensity to invest abroad.
Knowledge: The basic problem with the transfer of knowledge is one of
information asymmetry. The patent system offers a potential solution to this
problem, making it theoretically possible to transfer knowledge on the market
(licensing). But knowledge is often difficult to codify into patents, and
patent rights are costly to enforce, and hence offer uneven protection against
infringement. Therefore, firms which invest in the generation of knowledge
will often find it necessary to exploit it abroad through internalization
(Buckley and Casson 1976; Hennart 1982, 1991a; Rugman 1981; Teece 1981, 1986).
The greater the investment, the more likely the firm will manufacture abroad.
This relationship has been shown to hold in a number of empirical studies of
the determinants of FDI by U.S. and non-U. S. MNEs (Caves 1974; Drake and Caves
1992; Kogut and Chang 1991; Swedenborg 1979; Kimura 1989).
Reputation: Another type of firm-specific advantages is reputation
(goodwill) (Hennart 1982, 1991a). Trademarks are property rights on reputa-
tion. The ability of a firm to exploit its reputation depends on the extent to
which trademarks are protected from unauthorized imitation. Reputation can be
shared with foreign producers by renting them the use of a trademark (fran-
chising) . The efficiency of this solution depends on the cost of preventing
the renter from debasing quality. When this cost is high, the firm which has
invested in reputation will internalize its transfer by operating outlets
bearing its trademark (Hennart 1982). Everything else constant, the more a
firm invests in building reputation, the more it can be expected to manufac-
ture abroad, an hypothesis that has received empirical support in the case of
U.S. MNEs (Caves 1974; Pugel 1981).
Experience: The cost of doing business abroad offsets the benefits of
internalizing markets for intermediate inputs. We would expect the cost of
operating overseas to vary with a firm's experience of the target market
(Johansen and Vahlne 1977; Davidson 1980) . Therefore, everything else con-
stant, firms with previous experience of the target market are more likely to
further invest in that market.
2 . 2 Strategic Factors
We have seen that for internalization theorists the decision to manufac-
ture abroad depends on a firm's resources and on location factors. Strategic
interaction theorists argue that a firm's decision to engage in FDI hinges on
the behavior or expected behavior of its rival. Strategic interactions between
firms can be classified into collusion, avoidance, follow-the-leader,
exchange-of-threat, and competitive dynamics.
For a firm to react to its rivals, it must be affected by their actions
and be aware of it. This requires a particular type of market structure.
In monopolistic industries, there is only one firm, and hence it is obvious
that there is no interdependence between firms. Firms in competitive markets
are price takers, and they are sensitive to other competitors' actions, but
the impact of a firm on any other is slight, while the large number of
competitors makes collusion difficult. As a consequence, firms in competitive
markets do not react strategically to their competitors' moves. Strategic
interaction will be prevalent in market structures which are intermediate
between monopoly and perfect competition, where a firm's competitive position
is affected by the actions of identifiable rivals, i.e. in oligopolistic
industries (Friedman 1983)
Oligopoly can be defined as market structures in which there are two to
twelve firms (Yu and Ito 1988). There are two types of oligopolistic market
structure: tight and loose oligopoly. A tight oligopoly is a market dominated
by a few firms. In a loose oligopoly, there is a large number of competitors,
typically three or four to twelve. 2
Firms in tight oligopolistic industries are able and have incentives to
collude, as the small number of firms makes the cost of such action low and
the payoff high. Another type of strategic interaction taking place in a tight
oligopolistic industry is "avoidance". A firm avoids to take any competitive
action against its rival's moves due to the fear of retaliation. Collusion is
less attractive in a loose oligopoly because, while the payoff from collusion
is high (but not as high as that in a tight oligopoly), the cost of collusion
is higher. On the other hand, firms in a loose oligopolistic industry are
quite sensitive to their rival's moves, and can be expected to react so as to
maintain their competitive position, and hence to exhibit various types of
strategic behavior such as "follow-the-leader", "exchange-of-threat", and
"competitive dynamics".
The strategic rationale for FDI can thus be explained by four different
types of strategic behavior: 1) avoidance or collusion, 2) exchange-of-threat,
3) follow-the-leader, and 4) competitive dynamics. If firms from different
countries are involved, strategic interaction is either avoidance (or col-
lusion) or exchange-of-threat. On the other hand, if interactions are between
firms from the same country, strategic interaction takes the form of follow-
the-leader or competitive dynamics. The four types of strategic interactions
among Japanese and/or U.S. firm are described in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here
2.2.1 Avoidance or Collusion
Establishing a new manufacturing facility creates additional capacity.
This in turn may depress prices. Foreign investors may therefore avoid
entering concentrated industries in order to avoid retaliation from incumbents
(Solvell 1987). Through this unilateral promise (Schelling 1960), a firm can
reduce its rival's incentive to enter its own market.
Another way a foreign entrant can avoid warfare with an incumbent is for
each to promise not to enter each other's market (collusion). The higher the
concentration ratio of the target U.S. industry entered the less likely that
Japanese firms will enter it due to avoidance or collusive behavior.
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2.2.2 Exchange-of-threat
A good strategy for firms who see foreign firms enter their own domestic
market is to retaliate by invading the invader's home market, a strategy
called "exchange-of-threat" (Graham 1974, 1978; Vernon 1975; Watson 1982;
Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985). Hence the probability that a Japanese firm will
invest in the United States should increase if an American firm has previously
invested in its domestic market.
The impact of the "exchange-of-threat" principle on the propensity to
manufacture abroad was investigated by Graham (1974, 1978) and Flowers (1976).
Graham examined whether European and Canadian FDI in the U.S. was a response
to previous U.S. investment in Europe and Canada. His findings that the total
number of investments made by European MNEs in the U.S. was correlated with
the number of U.S. subsidiaries previously established in the respective
European countries offers only weak empirical support for the theory because
European investment in the U.S. was increasing over the time period under
study. Hence, the longer the time lag, the greater the correlation between
U.S. investments in Europe and European FDI in the U.S., even in the absence
of an exchange-of-threat effect. In addition, a 2-digit SIC industry clas-
sification is too broad to test the presence of exchange-of-threat (Solvell
1987). Exchange-of-threat interaction was also found to be prevalent in the
banking industry (Choi, Tschoegl, and Yu 1986). One criticism that can be
levied against all these studies is that they did not control for location and
governance determinants of FDI.
2.2.3 Follow-the-Leader
In the maturing stage of the product cycle, the foreign investment of one
industry member threatens the established market position of all others and
triggers their subsequent investment (Vernon 1966, 1975), a type of behavior
which has been called "follow-the-leader" (Knickerbocker 1973; Graham 1974).
The pattern of Japanese FDI in the U.S. and Europe has been explained by this
type of behavior (Encarnation 1987; Gittleman and Dunning 1991). As argued
before, follow-the-leader behavior is prevalent only in a loose oligopolistic
industry because firms in a tight oligopolistic industry will collude instead.
Hence the propensity of a Japanese firm to invest in the U.S. should be
greater, ceteris paribus, (1) if its rivals have already invested in the U.S.
and (2) it is in a loose oligopolistic industry.
Knickerbocker (1973) and Flowers (1976) attempted to test for the exis-
tence of this motive by measuring the extent to which foreign entry was
clustered in time (their "entry concentration index", or ECI ) and regressing
it on the concentration ratio of the investor's industry. They uncovered the
presence of a quadratic relation between industry concentration and the ECI,
with entry bunching increasing up to a certain level of industrial concentra-
tion ratio, but decreasing above this level (see also Caves et. al., 1980).
These empirical findings only offer weak support because neither Knickerbocker
nor Flowers controlled for location and governance factors. In addition, entry
bunching, as measured by the ECI, does not necessarily show oligopolistic
reaction but may indicate that all firms are faced with profitable investment
opportunities at the same time. A positive relationship between industry
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concentration ratio and ECI may also reflect the fact that large firms have a
greater tendency to invest abroad (Swedenborg 1979).
A more persuasive test is that by Yu and Ito (1988). They explained FDI
by both governance (R&D and advertising intensity) and strategic variables
(oligopolistic reaction) . Follow-the-leader motives were measured by the
number of other firms in the industry which had previously invested in the
host country. It is not clear why this measure should reflect pressures to
"follow-the-leader". As the authors indicate, it may also reflect the fact
that an increase in the number of investors generates additional information
about this market, thus lowering entry costs for firms which have not yet
invested. Hence it is difficult to know whether their results reflect follow-
the-leader behavior or information diffusion. Another limitation is that they
analyzed a limited number of industries (tires, textiles, and advertising).
2.2.4 Competitive Dynamics
The incentive to invest abroad may be also influenced by a firm's
domestic market position (Mascarenhas 1986; Ito and Pucik 1987; Roehl 1989).
Here it may be useful to distinguish between dominant and dominated firms.
Dominant firms are firms who have a solid domestic foothold and strong
competitive advantages (e.g. reputation, economies of scale, cumulative
learning, and preferred access to suppliers and distribution) as well as the
resources for retaliating and damaging challengers (Porter 1985). Such firms
have the largest domestic market shares 4 . Dominated firms, on the other hand,
may choose to venture abroad in order to avoid the retaliation from dominant
firms in their home market (Ito and Pucik 1987; Porter 1990) and because they
enjoy a relative competitive advantage over local firms in foreign markets
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(Mascarenhas 1986) . Small dominated firms may not have, however, enough
financial and managerial resources to invest abroad. Hence, we would expect
dominated firms with medium market shares to have a greater tendency to
manufacture abroad than dominant firms or dominated firms with smaller market
shares.
There is some evidence that this factor may explain Japanese FDI in the
U.S. As Abbeglen and Stalk (1985) note, it is not the firms with the largest
market share that have been the most active investors abroad. Sony entered the
U.S. before Matsushita, Honda before Toyota, and Epson before NEC (for other
examples see Roehl 1989). This pattern of entry seems to support the hypo-
thesis that being a dominated firm with medium market share (a "samurai") may
increase the probability of investing in the United States.
Location, governance, and strategic factors should therefore affect the
probability that a Japanese firm would manufacture a given product in the
United States. The relative importance of each of these three categories of
factors, both in general and in the case of Japanese FDI in the U.S., can be
ascertained by entering these variables simultaneously. To this we now turn.
3. Data and Methodology
3 . 1 Methodology and Dependent Variable
Our population consists of all Japanese manufacturing firms listed in the
1986 Japan Company Handbook. This list includes firms listed on the First and
Second Sections of the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya stock exchanges. After
excluding firms with more than 50 percent foreign ownership or with less than
200 employees and those with missing values, we were left with 680 firms.
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Comparison between the population and our sample shows that it is representa-
tive of the population. From Principal International Business we obtained the
list of all products (at the 4-digit SIC level) manufactured by these firms.
The dependent variable (INV) (n=l,799) is whether or not product j of firm i
was manufactured in the United States at the end of 1986. INV is equal to 1 if
this is the case, and otherwise. In 343 cases (or 19.1% of our sample), a
Japanese firm was manufacturing one of its products in the United States.
Because of the nature of the dependent variable, a binomial logistic
model is used in which the probability of producing product j in the U.S. is
explained by the independent variables. The regression coefficients estimate
the impact of the independent variables on the probability that a firm will
manufacture the product in the U.S. A positive coefficient means that the
variable increases the probability of manufacturing product j in the U.S. The
model can be expressed as
P(Yk = 1) = 1/(1 + exp(-a - XLB),
where YL is the dependent variable, XL is the vector of independent variables
for the ith observation, a is the intercept parameter, and B is the vector of
regression parameters (Hastings 1986).
3.2 Independent Variables
Three categories of variables are entered: location-specific, governance,
and strategic. Table 1 lists the independent variables and their predicted
signs.
Location-Specific Variables: Scale economies (SCALE) were measured by
plant-level MES (sum of the shipments of plants in the median and all higher
classes divided by the number of plants in these classes at the 4-digit SIC
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level) over total industry shipments 6 (Hladik 1985). Industry shipments data
were taken from the Census of Manufactures (1982). Everything else constant,
SCALE should be negatively related to FDI propensity.
The transportation cost (TRANS) of a given product was measured by the
radius within which 80% of its total tonnage (R80 ) is shipped (Weiss 1972).
Data on tons shipped by distance of shipment was taken from the 1977 Survey of
Transportation. The higher transportation cost, the smaller the radius, so
transportation cost is inversely related to TRANS. Hence the sign of TRANS
should be negative.
U.S. trade barriers (TB) are represented by a dummy equal to 1 if a
product category is subject to a high tariff rate or export restraints, and
zero otherwise. Data was taken from U.S. International Trade Commission
(1989). Everything else constant, the sign of TB should be positive.
Japan is resource-poor while the U.S. is relatively resource-abundant.
Hence, Japanese firms in resource-intensive industries are less likely to
serve the U.S. market through exports, and more likely to serve it through
FDI. A product's resource intensity (RES) is described by a dummy variable
equal to 1 if it is resource intensive and zero otherwise. 7 Everything else
constant, RES should be positively correlated with FDI propensity.
Another factor that may persuade Japanese firms to manufacture in the
U.S. is the presence there of their main customer. One characteristic of the
Japanese industrial system is the presence in many industries of Keiretsu
groups, tight vertical relationships between a main assembler (the first-tier
firm) and a large number of smaller subcontractors (second-tier firms). It has
been argued that many Japanese second-tier subcontractors have invested in the
U.S. at the request of their first-tier customer (Encarnation 1987). This
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follow-the-customer behavior (POLLCUS) was modeled by a dummy variable. The
dummy was set to one for all second-tier firms within a Keiretsu if their
first-tier firm manufactured any product in the U.S. at the end of 1984
,
8 and
to zero for first-tier firms, for second-tier firms within a Keiretsu if their
first-tier firm had not invested by 1984, and for firms which are not part of
Keiretsu groups. FOLLCUS should enter with a positive sign.
Governance Variables: The amount of technological know-how held by a
Japanese firm (RND) was measured by its R&D expenses divided by its total
sales normalized by the industry's average R&D intensity (source: Yukashoken
Hokokusho, Japan Company Handbook, and Toyo Keizai 1991). We expect a positive
relationship between RND and the propensity to manufacture in the U.S.
The Japanese parent's endowment of goodwill or reputation (ADV) was
measured by its domestic media advertising expenses divided by its domestic
sales normalized by the industry's average advertising intensity (source:
Yukashoken Hokokusho or Toyo Keizai 1991). The sign of ADV should be posi-
tive9 .
A Japanese parent which is already manufacturing product j in the US
market should have a higher propensity to manufacture other products k....n.
(Davidson 1980; Davidson and McFetridge 1985; Yu 1990). For example, Honda
used the experience of the U.S. it gained through motorcycle production to
produce automobiles (Kinugasa 1984). Country-specific experience (EXP) for a
given product is equal to 1 if a Japanese firm previously produced any product
in the U.S., and to zero otherwise. 10 EXP should have a positive sign.
Strategic Variables: Because of the threat of retaliation by incumbents,
Japanese firms are likely to avoid manufacturing products in the U.S. if the
market for this product is highly concentrated (Lall and Siddharthan 1982;
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Kogut and Chang 1991). The concentration ratio (USCON) of the target U.S.
industry was measured by the Herfindhal-Hirschman index for the 50 largest
companies at the 4-digit SIC level, as listed in the Census of Manufactures
(1982). The higher the value of USCON, the lower the propensity of Japanese
firms to manufacture in the U.S.
As argued above, a Japanese firm is more likely to manufacture a product
in the U.S. if U.S. firms are manufacturing this product in Japan. Following
Flowers (1976), exchange-of-threat (EZTH) is measured by the number of U.S.
firms which had invested in the Japanese firm's industry three year before a
Japanese firm's reverse investment in the U.S. (or 1986 in the case of non-
investment). As per our earlier discussion, we only count U.S. entries if the
Japanese industry is loosely oligopolistic. EZTH should be positively related
to the propensity of Japanese firms to manufacture in the U.S.
Everything else constant, the probability that a Japanese firm will
manufacture in the U.S. should be higher if it finds itself in the type of
situation where follow-the- leader behavior is likely to take place. In
contrast to previous studies, which have relied on indirect measures, we gauge
directly the intensity of pressures to follow-the-leader . Follow-the-leader
behavior should be higher in a loose oligopolistic industry than in a competi-
tive or tight oligopolistic industry (Knickerbocker 1973). Hence we first
checked whether a Japanese firm was in a loose oligopolistic industry. We then
ascertained whether any other Japanese firm in the same industry had previous-
ly invested in the U.S. 11 Follow-the-leader (FOLLOW) is described by a dummy
variable, equal to 1 if the Japanese firm is in a loose oligopolistic in-
dustry 12 and if its domestic rivals have already made previous investments in
the U.S., and zero otherwise. FOLLOW should be positively related with FDI
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propensity.
As argued above, we expect Japanese firms with medium domestic
market shares (the "samurai") to have a higher propensity to manufacture
products in the U.S. than firms with either a large or a very small market
share. A Japanese firm's domestic market share (SHARE) was calculated as the
ratio of its sales to the total sales of its industry. Since a medium SHARE
should lead to a greater propensity to manufacture in the U.S. than a very
high or a very low SHARE, we use the quadratic form of the domestic market
share (i.e. SHARE - SHARE2 ). SHARE should enter with a positive sign, and
SHARE2 with a negative one.
Other control variable: The growth rate of the target U.S. industry was
used as a control variable. Japanese investors should have greater incentives
to manufacture products in the U.S. when the demand for these products is
growing rapidly. GROWTH is the average 10-year growth rate of industry
shipments in the 4-digit SIC U.S. target industry, as listed in the 1982
Census of Manufactures . GROWTH should be positively related to a Japanese
firm's propensity to manufacture in the U.S.
Insert Table 1 about here
The correlation matrix of the independent variables (Table 2) suggests
little collinearity except for the correlation coefficient between SHARE and
SHARE2 (0.92) 13 . Except for this coefficient, almost all other correlations
are low, the highest correlation coefficient being the one between SCALE and
USCON (0.52).
Insert Table 2 about here
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4 . Results
The results of the binomial logistic regression model are presented in
Table 3. A positive coefficient for an independent variable means that it
tends to increase the probability that a Japanese firm manufactured a product
in the U.S. at the end of 1986: a negative coefficient signifies the opposite,
Insert Table 3 about here
Equation 1 in Table 3 reports the main results. The model, which con-
verged after six iterations, has a high overall explanatory power, with a chi-
square of 239.37 (p=0.0000). One can also measure how well a maximum likeli-
hood model fits the data by using it to classify observations (Amemiya 1981).
The classification rate thus obtained can be compared to the rate that would
have been obtained by chance. The rate is equal to a + (1-a) , where a is the
proportion of cases of non-investment (Morison 1974) . In our case, that base
line rate is 69%. Table 4 shows that our model correctly classifies 82.4% of
the observations, a rate higher than that which would be expected by chance.
The model's sensitivity rate, which describes its ability to correctly predict
positives (manufacture in the U.S.) leaves room for improvement, but its
specificity, its capacity to correctly classify cases of non-investment, is
excellent.
Insert Table 4 about here
With the exception of USCON, the U.S. industry concentration variable,
all significant variables have the predicted signs. The coefficient of plant
MES (SCALE) is negative and significant at 0.1 level as predicted. Japanese
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firms centralize at home the manufacture of products with large MES and
presumably serve the U.S. market through exports, a finding consistent with
those of previous empirical studies (Swedenborg 1979; Pugel 1981; Lall and
Siddharthan 1982). As predicted, the coefficient of the tariff and non-tariff
barriers (TB) variable is positive and significant at the 0.1 level, suggest-
ing that trade barriers incite Japanese firms to manufacture in the United
States. Kogut and Chang (1991) and Drake and Caves (1992) reached similar
conclusions.
RND, the Japanese firm's R&D intensity, is positive and significant at
the 0.01 level. Technology intensive Japanese firms manufacture in the U.S. in
order to internalize the market for their know-how. Kogut and Chang (1991)
also found that Japanese R&D-intensive industries were more likely to have
foreign direct investments in the U.S.
Previous U.S. market experience gained by Japanese investors (EXP) is
positive and significant at 0.05 level. This finding indicates that having
manufactured a given product in the U.S. does increase the probability that a
Japanese firm will start to manufacture another. In other words, Japanese
firms' tacit knowledge acquired in the U.S. market can be transferred across
product divisions.
Two strategic variables, the U.S. industry concentration ratio and the
Japanese firm's domestic market share, are significant. USCON is significant
at 0.1 level, but has a positive sign. This suggests that Japanese firms are
not deterred from entering concentrated U.S. product markets. Previous
findings on the relationship between host country concentration and investment
propensity have been ambiguous, with Kogut and Chang (1992) finding a signi-
ficantly negative relationship, and Caves, Porter and Spence (1980) reporting
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a significantly positive one. One possible explanation is that Japanese inves-
tors have employed niche strategies to overcome entry barriers prevalent in
highly concentrated U.S. industries. For example, Japanese investors have
avoided manufacturing large refrigerators in the U.S., focusing instead on
compact refrigerators, for which there was no American competition (Solvell
1987). Since both products are classified in the same 4-digit SIC industry,
the level of avoidance by Japanese investors is understated.
The Japanese firm's domestic market share (SHARE and SHARE ) is another
significant strategic variable. As expected, firms with medium market shares
are more likely to manufacture their products in the U.S. than those with
large or small market shares. The quadratic relationship between FDI propen-
sity and domestic market share (SHARE - SHARE2 ) is significant at the 0.01
level. This confirms the view that domestic pressure from dominant firms
stimulate Japanese dominated firms to invest abroad (Mascarenhas 1986; Roehl
1989; Porter 1990).
GROWTH, the coefficient of the growth rate of the target U.S. industry,
is positive and significant at 0.01 level. As argued earlier, high demand
growth attracts Japanese investors to manufacture in the U.S.
The coefficients of the transportation costs (TRANS), resource intensity
(RES), follow-the-customer (FOLLCUS), advertising intensity (ADV) , exchange-
of-threat (EZTH) , and follow-the-leader (FOLLOW) variables are all insig-
nificant. For unknown reasons, a similar measure of transportation costs
(TRANS) was also insignificant in two previous empirical studies of FDI (Pugel
1981; Caves et al, 1980). The lack of significance of the resource intensity
variable (RES) is contrary to Tsurumi's (1976) argument, but consistent with
the result of a recent study by Drake and Caves (1992). The fact that we are
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looking at Japanese investment as of 1986 may explain the lack of significance
of our follow-the-customer variable (FOLLCUS), since few second-tier suppliers
had had by then the time to follow their first-tier Keiretsu custome.
A firm's advertising intensity (ADV) in Japan has no impact on the
probability it will manufacture in the U.S. This finding, which is consistent
across recent studies of Japanese entries in the U.S. (Hennart 1991b; Drake
and Caves 1992; Hennart and Park 1993), suggests that goodwill earned in Japan
is not easily trans ferrable to the U.S. market due to differences in culture
and language.
The signs of the exchange-of-threat (EXTH) and follow-the-leader (FOLLOW)
variables are as predicted, but insignificant. One possible explanation for
the lack of significance of the exchange-of-threat variable is that there is
very little investment by U.S. firms in Japan. Hence, as noted by Graham
(1991), Japan is a major exception to the exchange-of-threat principle.
Our follow-the-leader variable is defined at the industry level. In
other words, we assume that Japanese firms react to the entry of their
industry rivals. One possibility, however, is that rivalry does not take place
between firms in an industry, but between Enterprise groups 14 (Gerlach 1987).
To test this hypothesis, we constructed a dummy variable FOLLOW 1 which takes a
value of one for firms in enterprise groups b....z manufacturing product j in
Japan if the corresponding firm in enterprise group a has already invested in
the U.S., and zero for first investors (if they are within an enterprise
group) and for firms manufacturing j in Japan but which are not members of an
enterprise group. As expected, the sign of FOLLOWl is positive and significant
at the 0.05 level (Equation 2 in Table 3), and the significance of other vari-
ables remains unchanged. This confirms Encarnation (1987) and Kester's (1991)
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anecdotal evidence of follow-the-leader behavior by Japanese investors in the
U.S., and underlines that this rivalry takes place between enterprise groups.
5 . Conclusions
This paper offers the first large scale product-level study of the
factors which influence Japanese firms to manufacture in the United States. We
simultaneously investigated the location, governance, and strategic deter-
minants of such investment. For the first time, four different types of
strategic motives are examined concurrently.
Our work significantly improves upon previous empirical studies of FDI.
First, we use firm-level data, not industry data, to measure firm-specific
advantages such as technological know-how and reputation. As noted above,
conducting the analysis at the firm level is much preferable for both theore-
tical and empirical reasons. Second, while previous investigations of the
impact of strategic motives on FDI used an indirect approach, we measure
strategic interactions directly. For example, while Knickerbocker tested the
impact of "follow-the-leader" by regressing an industry's entry concentration
index on its concentration ratio, we look directly at whether a firm is more
likely to manufacture in the U.S. if its rivals are already manufacturing
there. Lastly, by entering location, governance, and strategic variables
simultaneously, we are able to evaluate their relative impact. For these
reasons, the degree of confidence that can be attached to the results is
greater than that of previous studies.
By and large, our results support the predictions of the modern theory of
FDI, which combines location and transaction costs variables (see Hennart
1991a for a recent survey). Economies of scale and trade barriers have the
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expected impact, though transportation costs and resource intensity do not.
Technological intensity is a strong determinant of Japanese FDI, as in the
case of American and Swedish firms (Pugel 1981; Swedenborg 1979). Earlier
studies of Japanese investment in the U.S. had downplayed the role of tech-
nology exploitation, and highlighted that of resource-seeking (Yoshino 1976;
Tsurumi 1976). Our results suggest that the distinction between a U.S. and a
Japanese type of FDI is blurring. One remaining difference, though, is in the
impact of advertising expenditures.
On the strategic front, the significance of a Japanese firm's domestic
market share confirms Roehl's (1989) proposition that competition between
Japanese rivals in their home market plays a major role in explaining patterns
of Japanese FDI. Our results also show that Japanese investors react to
investment moves by their rivals, and that this game is played between
enterprise groups. Niche entry may explain why highly concentrated U.S. in-
dustries do not repel, but instead attract, Japanese FDI. The insignificance
of our exchange-of-threat variable is probably due to the small U.S. invest-
ment stake in Japan which does not present much of a threat to Japanese firms.
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Endnotes
1. Note, however, that as argued by Casson (1987) and Hennart (1991a), firm-
specific advantages are not necessary for a firm to expand abroad. Vertically-
integrated do not do so to exploit firm-specific advantages, but instead to
reduce transaction costs in markets for intermediate inputs. Hence a more general
statement of the conditions for FDI is that FDI arises from the internalization
of the market for intermediate inputs, including intangibles, such as knowledge
and reputation.
2. The range of a loose oligopoly is between 50 and 70 in terms of 8-firm
concentration ratio (Knickerbocker 1973; Scherer 1980), and between 1000 and 1800
in terms of Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (Seno 1983; Oster 1990).
3. The terms exchange-of-threat , exchange of hostages, cross-entry, and cross-
investment have been used interchangeably.
4. Porter (1980) classified firms into two types: industry leaders and followers.
In his study, industry leaders were defined as "the largest firms in the
industry, accounting for approximately 30% of industry sales revenues (p. 220)".
5. Trading companies are excluded.
6. MES is calculated with shipments in the median and higher classes because
shipments in classes below the median are typically very small.
7. SIC 20 (food and beverages), 24 (wood except furniture), 26 (pulp and paper),
29 (petroleum), 30 (rubber), 32 (stone and glass), and 33 (primary metals), are
classified as resource-intensive industries.
8. First entries of first-tier Keiretsu firms made in 1985 and 1986 are not
counted because we assumed that it takes at least two years for this "follow-
the-customer" pattern to take effect.
9. Data for R&D and advertising intensity of a Japanese firm was taken at the
firm- rather than the product-level due to the unavailability of product-level
data. However, most Japanese firms are not highly diversified (Clark 1979).
Hence, firm-level data are good substitute for product-level data. Another
problem in using R&D and advertising intensity as proxies for technological know-
how and reputation is that inputs are used to measure outputs. However, we can
expect that a firm with high R&D and advertising intensity will accumulate in-
house technological know-how and reputation.
10. Firms which entered the U.S. for the first time in 1985 and 1986 are coded
as inexperienced.
11. First entries made in 1985 and 1986 are not counted, since the lag would be
too short for us to observe subsequent "follow-the-leader" investments.
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12. The range of loose oligopoly is between 1000 and 1800 in terms of Herfindhal
and Hirschman Index (Seno 1983; Oster 1990).
13. The results were not sensitive to this correlation, as excluding SHARE2 did
not affect the coefficients.
14. We thank Koji Taira for this suggestion. Enterprise groups are groups of
horizontally-related firms, in contrast to Keiretsu groups, in which members are
vertically related.
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Figure 1
International Expansion Decision-Making Process
Where to produce? Who is to produce?
Produce
at home
( export
)
Firm-specific
advantages
Sales of
advantages
through
licensing/
franchising
Produce
abroad
Integrate
into
production
subsidiary
source: Hennart
, Jean-Francois. 1991, "The Transaction Cost Theory of the
Multinational Enterprise," in Christos N. Pitelis and Roger Sugden,
eds., The Nature of the Transnational Firm, London and New York, P. 86
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Figure 2
Types of Strategic Interactions
Interaction involving
U.S. firms
(host country)
YES NO
YES
Interaction
involving
Japanese firms
(home country)
NO
Avoidance/ Follow-the-leader
Collusion
or or
Exchange-of-threat Competitive
dynamics (Samurai)
Follow-the-leader
or No interaction
Competitive
dynamics
Avoidance or Collusion: If there are powerful rivals in the U.S., a
Japanese firm will avoid entering the U.S. market or will collude with its
rivals in the U.S. market.
Exchange-of-threat : If a U.S. firm has penetrated into a Japanese
market, a Japanese firm may retaliate by invading the corresponding U.S.
market
.
Follow-the-leader: If a Japanese firm in a loose oligopolistic industry
goes abroad, its Japanese rivals in that industry may follow.
Competitive dynamics (Samurai) : If dominated firms in Japanese markets
are subject to competitive pressure from dominant firms in that market, the
dominated firms ("the samurai") will be more likely to invest in the U.S. than
their dominant rivals.
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Table 1
Summary of Variables and Expected Signs
(+ = encourages FDI)
Variable Name Description Expected Signs
Dependent Variable
INVT whether a Japanese firm i manufactured
product j in the U.S. at the end of 1986
dummy: l=yes, 0=no
Independent Variables
Location-specific Variables
SCALE MES / industry shipment in the U.S.
for product j
TRANS transportation radius in the U.S. -
for product j
TB U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers +
for product j
dummy: l=yes, 0=no
RES whether product j is a resource-intensive +
product
dummy: l=yes, 0=no
FOLLCUS whether firm i is a member of the Keiretsu +
group whose lst-tier firm manufactured
any product in the U.S.
dummy: l=yes, 0=no
Governance Variables
RND R&D / sales for firm i +
ADV ADV / sales for firm i +
EXP whether firm i was already manufacturing +
any other product k ... n in the U.S.
dummy: l=yes, 0=no
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Strategic Variables
USCON U.S. industry concentration ratio
for product j
EXTH number of U.S. firms manufacturing
product j in Japan during 3 years
preceding firm i manufactured the same
product in the U.S. at 3- digit SIC level
FOLLOW whether firm i is in a Japanese loose
oligopolistic industry and it is not
the first one to manufacture product j
in the U.S.
dummy: l=yes, 0=no
SHARE firm i's market share in Japan
SHARE' square of firm i's market share in Japan
Control Variable
GROWTH average 10 years U.S. industry growth rate
of product j
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix
SCALE -0.03 1.00
TRANS 0.10 -0.04 1.00
TB 0.06 0.02 -0.03 1.00
RES -0.02 0.10 -0.29 -0.08 1.00
FOLLCUS-0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.01 -0.06 1.00
RNO 0.18 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.10 1.00
ADV 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.00 -0.04 0.14 1.00
EXP 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.18 0.05 1.00
USCON 0.04 0.52 0.08 0.13 -0.05 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00
EXTH 0.04 0.06 -0.08 0.02 -0.21 -0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.01 1.00
FOLLOW 0.04 -0.11 0.12 0.20 -0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.29 1.00
SHARE 0.27 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.09 0.20 0.15 0.35 0.06 0.02 -0.03 1.00
SHARE2 0.22 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.04 0.13 0.14 0.27 0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.92 1.00
GROWTH 0.18 -0.14 0.49 0.05 -0.14 -0.00 0.05 0.03 0.08 -0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 1.00
INVT SCALE TRANS TB RES FOLLCUS RND ADV EXP USCON EXTH FOLLOW SHARE SHARE2 GROWTH
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Table 3
Results of Logistic Regression( = encourages FDD
Variable Name Description Coefficients (t-statistic)
1 2
Intercept
SCALE
TRANS
TB
RES
FOLLCUS
RNO
ADV
EXP
USCON
EXTH
FOLLOW
F0LL0U1
SHARE
SHARE2
GROWTH
model chi -square
p- value
n
correctness
* p=0.1 **
MES / industry shipment in the U.S.
for product j,
transportation radius in the U.S.
for product j.
U.S. tariff and non-tariff barriers
for product j.
whether product j, is a resource- intensive
product
whether a firm j. is a member of the
Keiretsu group whose 1st- tier firm
manufactured any product in the U.S.
R&D / sales for firm j.
ADV / sales for firm j.
whether firm j. is already manufacturing
any other product k . . . n in the U.S.
U.S. industry concentration ratio
for product ±
number of U.S. firms manufacturing
product j. in Japan during 3 years
preceding firm j.'s US investment
dummy = 1 if firm j. is in a loose
oligopolistic industry and is not the
first one to manufacture j. in the US
dummy =1 if firm j_ is in an enterprise
group and is not the first one to
manufacture product i in the US.
firm j_'s market share in Japan
square of firm j.'s market share in Japan
average 10 years U.S.
of product j.
industry growth rate
-3.1991 -3.1750
(11.65)*** (11.59)***
17.3730 -16.4980
(1.90)* (1.84)*
0.0003 0.0003
(1.01) (1.01)
0.2226 0.2282
(1.32)* (1.40)*
0.0847 0.1055
(0.50) (0.63)
0.0947 0.1017
(0.43) (0.46)
0.2149 0.2157
(4.27)*** (4.27)***
-0.0137 -0.0130
(0.35) (0.33)
0.3390 0.3005
(2.28)** (2.00)**
0.0002 0.0002
(1.52)* (1.49)*
0.0573 0.0556
(0.86) (0.87)
0.0738
(0.44)
0.6005
(2.31)**
0.0863 0.0824
(6.67)*** (6.32)***
-0.0009 -0.0009
(3.88)*** (3.61)***
0.0406 0.0396
(4.42)*** (4.34)***
239.37 247.15
0.0000 0.0000
1799 1799
82.4 82.3
p=0.05 p=0.01
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Table 4
Classification Table
PREDICTED
NOT INVEST INVEST TOTAL
TRUE
NOT INVEST
INVEST
TOTAL
1427
287
1714
29
56
85
1456
343
1799
SENSITIVITY:
SPECIFICITY:
CORRECT:
16.3%
98.0%
82.4%
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